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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This appeal is from a final order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal 
was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court which has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j), 
U.C.A. The Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of 
Appeals, pursuant to section 78-2-2(4), U.C.A. The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section 
78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in substituting its judgment 
for that of the board of county commissioners in reversing the 
board's determination that the plaintiff's bid proposal was non-
responsive to the County's invitation for bids? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and to 
resolve any doubt or uncertainty concerning the evidence in the 
defendants' favor? 
3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment 
in plaintiff's favor under a breach of contract theory? 
4. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment 
in plaintiff's favor under a negligence theory? 
5. Did the district court err in awarding damages in the 
nature of anticipated lost profits? 
Standard of review: In considering a summary judgment motion. 
1 
the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing summary judgment. Conder v. A.L. Williams 
& Assocs.. Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987). The analytical 
standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is the same as 
that of the trial court: the appellate court reviews the facts and 
inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. If the appellate court concludes that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists, the summary judgment will be 
overturned and the case remanded for further proceedings on that 
issue. Where no material facts remain unresolved, the appellate 
court examines the trial court's conclusions of law and reviews 
them for correctness. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 
946 (Utah App. 1989); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND ORDINANCES 
The relevant rules and ordinances whose interpretation is 
determinative are: 
1. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced in the 
addendum to the brief). 
2. The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as 
amended, section 1-2-9, entitled Contracts (reproduced in the 
addendum to the brief). 
3. The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as 
amended, section 18-1-1, et seq., entitled Purchasing Procedures 
(reproduced in the addendum to the brief). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. 
(Wadsworth) initiated this action in district court seeking 
injunctive relief or, alternatively, damages against Salt Lake 
County (County). Wadsworth was one of two construction companies 
that submitted bid proposals in response to the County's invitation 
for bids for the work of constructing a county flood control 
project. Wadsworth, the unsuccessful bidder, alleged in its 
complaint that the County improperly rejected its bid proposal as 
non-responsive and awarded the contract to the other bidder, Gerber 
Concrete Construction, Inc. (Gerber), in contravention of the terms 
and conditions set forth in the Invitation to Bid. In its answer, 
the County denied that its rejection of Wadsworth's bid proposal 
as non-responsive was improper or contrary to the Invitation to 
Bid. The County affirmatively alleged, inter alia, that its 
decision to accept or reject a bid for a contract is a 
discretionary matter vested by law with the board of county 
commissioners and the court should not intervene in the process 
unless there is evidence of abuse of discretion, dishonesty, fraud 
or collusion in the awarding process, no such allegation being 
raised in this case. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Wadsworth initially sought a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to stop the County and Gerber from 
proceeding with the project (R. 52-55, 29-40). Wadsworth's motion 
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for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was 
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985. At the hearing, 
Wadsworth requested a "permanent injunction" (R. 176), and the 
court initially ruled that it would grant a permanent injunction 
against the County (R. 28). Following the hearing, Wadsworth 
submitted a proposed order granting a permanent injunction which 
contained findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 86-92). The 
County filed an objection to the proposed order, findings, and 
conclusions (R. 67-70) together with a memorandum of law (R. 56-
66) . A hearing was held on the County's objection on September 13, 
1985, and the court subsequently reversed its earlier ruling and 
entered an Order denying Wadsworth's motion for injunctive relief 
(R. 97-98). 
Following completion of the construction of the flood control 
project by Gerber, the County filed a motion for summary judgment 
and supporting memorandum (R. 110-125). The motion was initially 
heard and granted by the court on June 22, 1987 (R. 126-128). 
Thereafter, Wadsworth filed a motion for relief from judgment and 
rehearing (R. 131-135). The County's motion for summary judgment 
was reheard on June 29, 1987, at which time the court granted the 
motion in part and denied it in part (R. 189-190) . The court ruled 
that Wadsworth was no longer entitled to seek injunctive relief due 
to mootness (the project having been completed) but could continue 
to seek monetary damages against the County. 
On July 12, 1989, Wadsworth filed a motion for summary 
judgment, affidavit, and supporting memorandum (R. 224-284), 
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alleging that Wadsworth was entitled to recover damages in the 
nature of lost profits under two separate theories, namely: (1) 
"breach of contract to award the project to Wadsworth" and (2) 
"negligence in considering and rejecting Wadsworth's bid" (R. 225) . 
The County filed a memorandum in opposition to Wadsworth's motion 
(R. 331-357), together with six opposing affidavits (R. 289-330)• 
On December 14, 1989, the court entered its order granting 
Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment "as prayed." (R. 429-431). 
The County filed its notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 12, 1990 (R. 434-435). On April 24, 1990, the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July of 1985, Salt Lake County invited bids for the work 
of constructing a flood control project known as the Scott Avenue 
Basin on Millcreek at 800 East, by issuing a public Invitation to 
Bid to all licensed and qualified construction contractors (R. 2-
3, 209). 
Prior to issuing the Invitation to Bid, the County contracted 
with an independent consultant, Eckhoff, Watson and Preator 
Engineering (Consultant), to assist the County in preparing bid 
documents, advertising the project for bids, attending the bid 
opening, reviewing the tabulation of bids, and advising the County 
as to the proper action to be taken regarding the award of the 
contract (R. 290-292). 
The County designated the bidding to be under sealed 
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competitive public bidding and designated the date of July 29, 
1985, at 11:30 a.m., as the time when all bids would be opened and 
publicly read and an apparent low responsible bidder designated (R. 
3, 209). 
At the bid opening on July 29, 1985, the County, through its 
designated representatives, opened the sealed bids of all bidders 
on the project (R. 280) . The bid of each bidder was publicly read, 
and Wadsworth was initially designated as the apparent low bidder 
(R. 280) . This was an initial designation and not a final 
designation, being contingent upon the acceptance of the bid 
proposal and the awarding of the contract by the board of county 
commissioners (R. 280, 8). 
The Consultant then tabulated and verified the bids received 
on the project and on July 30, 1985 provided to the County a copy 
of the Bid Tabulation, together with a letter containing the 
Consultant's findings and recommendation (R, 290, 293-302). 
In tabulating and verifying the bids, the Consultant found 
that the bid proposals submitted by both Wadsworth and Gerber 
contained minor extension errors (which were corrected by the 
Consultant in the Bid Tabulation), and that the apparent low bid 
submitted by Wadsworth contained irregularities on the bid form 
which made Wadsworth's bid proposal non-responsive to the County's 
invitation to bid (R. 293) . In its letter, the Consultant stated: 
The bid submitted by Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company is not responsive to the invitation to bid 
because it violated the Rules Governing Bids as outlined 
in the Instructions to Bidders. On Schedule D, two 
prices were listed for Item 1 Basin Floodwalls and these 
two prices were also listed in the subtotal for Schedule 
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D and the Bidding Schedule Summary. Of the two Total Bid 
amounts listed, one was the apparent low bid, as stated 
above, in the amount of $692,640*48 and the second bid 
was the second low bid amount (behind Gerber's bid) in 
the amount of 792,140.48, This represents an addition 
to the bid form, an alternative proposal, and a 
modification of the bid form which was not specifically 
called for in the contract documents and may result in 
the County's rejection of the bid because it violated the 
rules of bidding. (R. 293). 
The Consultant made the following recommendation to the 
County: 
Based upon the irregularity of wadsworth's bid and the 
rules governing bidding, we recommend that the County 
exercise it"s right to reject it as not being responsive 
and that the contract be awarded to Gerber Concrete 
Construction. (R. 293). 
In the County's Invitation to Bid/ the following rules were 
included in the Instructions to Bidders under the Rules Governing 
Bids: 
1.3.03 Changes in or additions to the bid form, 
recapitulations of the work bid upon, alternative 
proposals, or any other modification of the bid form 
which is not specifically called for in the contract 
documents may result in the County's rejection of the bid 
as not being responsive to the invitation.... (R. 9). 
1.3.04 The Board of County Commissioners reserves the 
right to reject any and all proposals, and to waive any 
informality in the proposal received. (R. 9). 
The Instructions to Bidders, under the heading "Preparation 
of Bid," included the following instruction: 
1.2.04 On the bidding schedule of the proposal form 
the unit prices shall be written in ink or typed both in 
words and numerals. In cases of discrepancy the amount 
in words shall be construed to be the desired amount. 
(R. 8) . 
The County's Invitation to Bid contained the following 
statement on the Bidding Schedule Summary page: "THE AWARD OF 
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CONTRACT, IF MADE, WILL BE TO THE LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE 
BIDDER, PURSUANT TO COUNTY ORDINANCE." (R. 23). 
On July 31, 1985, two days after the bid opening, Wadsworth 
sent a letter to Neil Stack, a county employee, which stated: "This 
letter is to clarify some confusion concerning our bid on 
referenced project." (R. 439, exhibit 2). The letter indicated 
that Wadsworth had inadvertently forgotten to erase certain 
penciled-in figures, "thus causing some confusion as to which 
number should be used." (R. 439, exhibit 2). 
On August 14, 1985, the board of county commissioners held a 
public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the bid proposals and 
awarding the contract (R. 268-270). During the hearing, 
Wadsworth's President, Ralph Wadsworth, stated his objections to 
the contract being awarded to Gerber, arguing that the commission 
has the right to waive any irregularities in a bid or to rebid the 
project (R. 269). 
In response, Thomas B. Larson, a deputy county attorney, 
stated that although the bidding instructions allow the board to 
waive any informality in a bid, the informality must not rise to 
the degree that it makes the bid uncertain or ambiguous. He 
further stated that the bid submitted by Wadsworth contained two 
different figures in the total price block, one in pencil and one 
in ink; that the two total price figures submitted by Wadsworth 
straddled the total price figure submitted by Gerber, one high and 
one low; and that if there had been no other bidder within the high 
to low range of Wadsworth's two figures, then Wadsworth could have 
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argued for the higher pencil price by requesting that the pencil 
informality be waived. He noted that the County has on occasion 
waived the ink requirement and the requirement that all prices be 
in writing as well as in numbers (R. 307-312). 
After having reviewed the relevant bidding documents and 
having considered the statements and recommendations of all 
interested parties, the board of county commissioners voted to 
award the contract to Gerber (R. 313-330). 
The board determined that the bid proposal submitted by 
Wadsworth was not acceptable for the following reasons: (1) the 
bid proposal form contained multiple entries in several places, 
including two different figures in the box for the total bid price, 
thus making the bid proposal ambiguous as to the total price; and 
(2) the two different figures in the total bid price space in the 
Wadsworth bid straddled the total bid price of the Gerber bid, thus 
giving the Wadsworth bid a potentially unfair competitive advantage 
by allowing Wadsworth to claim either figure as its intended bid 
(R. 313-330). 
Subsequent to the awarding of the contract to Gerber on August 
14, 1985, Wadsworth took no action to protest the award until after 
construction on the project had commenced, with the result that 
considerable work had been completed by the time Wadsworth's motion 
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was 
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985 (R. 45, 163). 
After this lawsuit was filed, the County took the depositions 
of Ralph Wadsworth, Wadsworth's president, and Guy Wadsworth, 
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Wadsworth1s general manager and estimator (R. ^ « and 439). They 
testified that Guy Wadsworth had prepared Wadsworth's bid proposal 
(deposition exhibit 1) and had then given it to Ralph Wadsworth to 
sign and carry to the bid opening. Twenty minutes before the bid 
opening, Ralph Wadsworth called Guy Wadsworth on the telephone and 
told him that he was worried about the bid because he hadn't seen 
any other bidders and their bid was approximately $200,000.00 below 
the engineer's estimate. Ralph Wadsworth testified: 
The engineer's estimate. It was something like 
$900,000. So, I asked him how the hell come ours was 
$692,000, why we were so low. 
And he said, That's the way it turned out. He 
thought he was all right on them, but maybe he better 
have another look at it. So, I told him I would call him 
back. He better look and make sure he didn't make any 
mistakes. 
Then I said, Maybe you better give me a higher 
figure to go in here in case I can't get you back or 
something. What's the possibility of your error, if you 
made an error or something? We discussed that, and we 
arrived at $100,000. 
And I asked him how many guys were bidding the job. 
And he says there was a lot of bidders. And I said, 
There are a lot? I haven't seen anybody yet. Is this 
job more rough than you think it is? Because we never 
had bid a job where there was one or two bidders in the 
last five years. It seems like on County jobs, there are 
eight or ten bidders. 
So, I was worried about it. I was concerned that 
since there wasn't a lot of bidders, maybe the job was 
a lot more difficult than Guy had thought. And due to 
the fact that we were $200,000 under the estimate, he 
better look at it. 
(R. 438, pp. 10-11). Following their telephone conversation, Ralph 
Wadsworth wrote in the higher figures in pencil on the bid proposal 
(R. 438, pp. 9-10). Guy Wadsworth testified: 
Q Were the pencil figures just splitting the 
difference between the estimate, the engineer's estimate, 
and your figures? 
A Yes. We wanted to put a contingency number in 
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in case I had made a serious mistake. And the idea being 
that he would get back to me after I had had a few 
minutes to review it. If for some reason he couldn't get 
through to me because of lack of an available phone or 
whatever reason, we would have to take a chance on being 
kicked out because of the bid being too high. But we 
wanted to hedge our bets, I guess. 
(R. 439, p. 7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
DETERMINATION OF LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE BIDDER. 
The board of county commissioners rejected Wadsworth's bid 
proposal because the board determined it was non-responsive to the 
County's invitation for bids. In reversing the determination of 
the board, the district court failed to apply the correct standard 
of judicial review to the board's determination. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
County, the board of county commissioners had a "reasonable basis" 
for rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal as non-responsive to the 
County's invitation for bids. The board's determination was not 
arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, and in the 
absence of such a finding, the district court erred by improperly 
substituting the court's own judgment for that of the board. 
LIABILITY UNDER THEORY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth's bid 
proposal was wrongfully rejected, Wadsworth was still not entitled 
to summary judgment under a breach of contract theory. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that a bid 
proposal submitted in response to an invitation for bids for a 
public construction contract creates no contractual relationship, 
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either express or implied, between the bidder and the public 
entity. 
In the present case, applying the rule and test adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court, there was no contract, either express or 
implied, entered into between Wadsworth and the County. Because 
there was no contractual relationship, there could be no breach of 
contractual duties by the County. Thus, the district court erred 
in ruling that the County "breached contractual duties" in 
rejecting Wadsworthfs bid. 
LIABILITY UNDER THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
The courts have not recognized any cause of action for 
"negligent consideration and rejection of bids" in the area of 
public construction contracts. The appropriate standard of 
judicial review for contested awards of public construction 
contracts is that the courts will not attempt to control the 
discretion of public officials, nor substitute the courts' judgment 
for that of the public officials, except upon evidence of abuse of 
discretion, fraud, or corruption. This is true even if the 
official's decision appears erroneous or if reasonable persons may 
disagree. 
In the present case, the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment under a theory of negligence for the following 
reasons. First, Wadsworth's complaint failed to allege a claim for 
negligence. Second, even if it did allege a negligence claim, such 
claim has not been recognized by the courts in the area of public 
construction contracts. Third, even if such claim were actionable, 
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summary judgment was inappropriate in view of the evidence in the 
record which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
County, raises genuine issues as to material facts, 
DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF ANTICIPATED LOST PROFITS, 
Wadsworth was not entitled to recover damages in the nature 
of lost profits under any applicable theory of liability. The 
judicial remedies available to a wrongfully rejected bidder on a 
public construction contract do not include an award of anticipated 
lost profits. This rule is based upon sound principles of public 
policy. Although a few courts have begun to allow unsuccessful 
bidders to recover damages in the nature of bid preparation costs 
under a theory of implied contract or promissory estoppel, the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically rejected this approach in the Rapp case 
where it declined to allow the recovery of bid preparation costs 
under an implied contract theory. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth 
was entitled to recover damages in the nature of lost profits, 
Wadsworth's claimed amount of lost profits lacked proper foundation 
and was based upon speculation. As a result, genuine issues of 
material fact existed with regard to the amount, if any, of 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR 
THAT OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS IN REVERSING 
THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT WADSWORTH'S BID PROPOSAL 
WAS NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S INVITATION TO BID. 
The board of county commissioners determined that Wadsworth's 
bid proposal was non-responsive to the county's invitation for bids 
because: (1) it contained multiple entries in several places in 
violation of the Rules Governing Bids and was ambiguous as to the 
total bid price, and (2) it gave Wadsworth an unfair competitive 
advantage over other bidders by allowing Wadsworth to claim either 
price as its intended bid. As a result, the board rejected 
Wadsworth's bid proposal and determined that Gerber was the lowest 
responsive, responsible bidder. 
The district court, in ruling on Wadsworth's motion for 
summary judgment, substituted the court's own judgment for that of 
the board of county commissioners as to whether or not Wadsworth's 
bid was responsive to the County's invitation for bids and ruled 
that: "Plaintiff [Wadsworth] was the low, responsive, responsible 
bidder on the project and defendants should have awarded the 
project to plaintiff." (R. 424). 
A. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS' DETERMINATION THAT WADSWORTH'S BID WAS 
NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S INVITATION TO BID. 
It has long been established as a rule of law in most 
jurisdictions, including Utah, that public bodies are vested with 
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discretion in deciding to accept or reject bids on public 
construction projects, and that the courts should not interfere 
with the decision of the public body, nor substitute the court's 
judgment for that of the public body, unless there is evidence of 
abuse of discretion, dishonesty, fraud, or collusion in the 
awarding process. The appropriate standard of judicial review for 
a contested award of a public construction contract has been stated 
as follows: 
Although, under appropriate forms and methods of 
procedure hereinafter considered, the courts may review 
the action of city officials in awarding a contract, in 
the absence of fraud, corruption or. abuse of discretion, 
the determination of the proper officers in making an 
award will not be disturbed by the courts. Thus, while 
it is the court's duty to determine whether or not 
municipal officials have exercised their discretion in 
an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner, and to 
determine the soundness of allegations of fraud, 
collusion, or misconduct, a court will not attempt to 
control the municipal discretion nor substitute its 
judgment for that of the municipal officials. (Emphasis 
added.) 
McQuillin, Municipal corporations, section 29.83 (3rd Ed), citing 
Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974); Clavton v. Salt 
Lake Citv. 387 P.2d 93 (Utah 1963); and Schulte v. Salt Lake Citv. 
10 P.2d 625 (Utah 1932). 
In the Schulte case, the Utah Supreme Court stated the 
following rule as the standard of judicial review where statutes 
or ordinances require that contracts for public improvements be let 
to the lowest responsible bidder: 
Courts will not interfere with the decision of the city 
authorities in awarding a contract if such decision is 
founded upon such facts that it is not a manifest abuse 
of discretion, is exercised in good faith, is in the 
interest of the public and is without collusion or fraud, 
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and is not influenced by motives of personal favoritism 
or ill will. 
(10 P.2d, at 628). The above standard for judicial review of 
contract awards has been applied by courts to review decisions 
involving questions concerning both; (1) the responsibility of 
bidders and (2) the responsiveness of bids. (In the present case, 
both Wadsworth and Gerber were qualified as responsible bidders, 
i.e., properly licensed and able to perform the contract in a 
prompt and workmanlike manner, and the only issue was the 
responsiveness of Wadsworth1s bid.) 
For example, in the case of State v. Bowers Office Products, 
Inc., 621 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1980), the Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that the superior court below erred in substituting its judgment 
for that of the state department of administration as to the 
department's finding that the plaintiff's bid was non-responsive 
to the invitation. The Court stated: 
In Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1971) we 
reversed a superior court decision in which the court had 
substituted its judgment for that of the agency in 
determining whether certain bids were non-responsive. 
The proper judicial inquiry, we held, was whether there 
was a reasonable basis for the agency's action. Our 
decision rested on the policies underlying strict 
enforcement of bidding procedures, and also on the 
principle that courts should not interfere with the 
policy decisions which are inherent in establishing 
criteria to be applied in making awards. 
621 P.2d, at 13. The Court noted that a decision to strictly 
enforce bidding procedures will necessarily lead to the rejection 
of certain bids as non-responsive, and that a decision rejecting 
a bid for non-responsiveness goes to the integrity of the entire 
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competitive bidding process. In ruling that the superior court 
erred in substituting its judgment for that of the state department 
of administration, the Court found that "...the department had a 
'reasonable basis' to determine that the defect in Bowers1 bid was 
material and that the bid was nonresponsive." 621 P.2d, at 14. 
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied a reasonable 
basis test in reversing a decision of the district court below 
which had substituted its judgment for that of the contracting 
agency. State v. Weisz & Sons. Inc., 713 P.2d 176 (Wyo. 1986). 
After noting that the courts are warranted in setting aside an 
agency's action only where the action is arbitrary or fraudulent 
or where there is an illegal exercise of discretion, the court 
stated: 
We are unable to find from the statutes, applicable 
case law, rules and regulations, and the record on appeal 
that the procedures followed by [defendants] in seeking 
bids and awarding the contract to be any other than 
lawful, reasonable, and in the exercise of honest 
judgment, good faith, and accepted competitive bid 
practices. Under those circumstances, the judiciary of 
this state cannot interfere and substitute its judgment 
for that of the responsible agency or perform the duties 
properly belonging to [defendants] in the awarding of a 
contract. 
713 P.2d, at 185. 
By analogy, the federal courts have also applied a reasonable 
basis test in reviewing allegations of abuse of discretion or 
otherwise improper conduct involved in disputed contract awards 
under the federal procurement system. See Keco Industries v. 
United States, 492 F.2d 1200 (Ct.Cl. 1974); M. Steinthal & Co. v. 
Seamans. 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C.Cir. 1971). In Steinthal. the court 
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stated: 
If the court finds a reasonable basis for the agency's 
action, the court should stay its hand even though it 
might, as an original proposition, have reached a 
different conclusion as to the proper administration and 
application of the procurement regulations. 
455 F.2d, at 1301-02. 
In the present case, there was no allegation or evidence mat 
the board of county commissioners acted arbitrarily, capriciously, 
or abused its discretion in rejecting Wadsworth's bid as non-
responsive and in awarding the contract to Gerber. Nor was there 
any allegation of fraud or corruption in the awarding process. The 
district court made no finding or conclusion that the board had 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or had abused its discretion, 
or was guilty of fraud or corruption; instead, the district court 
simply substituted its own judgment for that of the board of county 
commissioners. The failure of the district court to apply the 
correct standard of judicial review to the board's determination 
in this case constituted error as a matter of law. 
B. 
IN RULING ON WADSWORTH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN 
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE COUNTY AND TO RESOLVE 
ANY DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
COUNTY'S FAVOR. 
In considering a motion for summary "judgment, ".•*the court 
must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly 
drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634, at 637 (Utah App. 1987); Frisbee v. K & K 
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Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, at 389 (Utah 1984). This Court has 
also applied the same standard when reviewing a summary judgment 
granted by a lower court: 
Our analytical standard for review of a summary judgment 
is the same as that of the trial court: we review the 
facts and inferences from those facts in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, at 1156 (Utah App. 1989); citing 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, at 946 (Utah App. 1989). 
Viewing the facts and inferences from those facts in the light 
most favorable to the County, the board of county commissioners 
had a "reasonable basis" for its determination that Wadsworth's bid 
was non-responsive to the County's invitation for bids, and the 
board's determination was based upon such facts that it was not a 
manifest abuse of discretion or the result of arbitrary or 
capricious action. 
The record establishes that, in tabulating and verifying the 
bid proposals, the County's independent outside consultant, 
Eckhoff, Watson and Preator Engineering (Consultant), found that 
the bid proposal submitted by Wadsworth listed two prices on 
Schedule D for Item 1 Basin Floodwalls and also listed two prices 
in both the Schedule D Subtotal and the Total Bid boxes on the 
Bidding Schedule Summary. Because this constituted an addition to 
the bid form, an alternative proposal, and a modification of the 
bid form which was not specifically called for in the contract 
documents, in violation of the Rules Governing Bids set forth in 
the Instructions to Bidders, the Consultant recommended that the 
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County reject Wadsworth's bid proposal as being non-responsive and 
award the contract to Gerber (R. 289-302). 
At the public hearing on August 14, 1985, the board of county 
commissioners, after having reviewed the bidding documents and 
having considered the statements and recommendations of all 
interested parties, declined to waive the irregularities in 
Wadsworth's bid proposal and voted to award the contract to Gerber 
for the reasons that: (1) the bid proposal form submitted by 
Wadsworth contained multiple entries in several places, including 
two different figures in the box for the total bid price, thus 
making the bid proposal ambiguous as to the total price; and (2) 
the two different figures in the total bid price in the Wadsworth 
bid ($692,640.48 and $792,140.48) straddled the total bid price of 
the Gerber bid ($739,414.62), thus giving the Wadsworth bid an 
unfair competitive advantage by allowing Wadsworth to claim either 
figure as its intended total bid price (R. 313-330, 302) . 
An irregularity in a bid will render the bid materially non-
responsive where the bidder gains "...a substantial advantage or 
benefit not enjoyed by other bidders." Carl Bolander & Sons Co. 
v. City of Minneapolis, 438 N.W.2d 735 (Minn.App. 1989), affirmed, 
451 N.W.2d 204, at 207 (Minn. 1990); Farmer Construction Ltd. v. 
State Dept. of Gen. Admin., 656 P.2d 1087 (Wash. 1983); State v. 
New Mexico Deot. of Fin. & Admin., 704 P.2d 79 (N.M.App. 1985). 
For example, in Bolander, the lowest bidder failed to list 
women-owned subcontractors in its bid as required by the 
invitation. The court ruled that this irregularity made the bid 
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materially non-responsive because it gave the bidder two 
advantages: (1) the ability to "repent" after discovering its bid 
was too low or otherwise too difficult to fulfill, and (2) the 
opportunity to further negotiate. 451 N.W.2d, at 206-7. 
In the present case, Wadsworth's inclusion of two different 
figures in various places in its bid, including in the box 
designated for the Total Bid Price, gave Wadsworth an advantage not 
enjoyed by other bidders. The multiple price entries in 
Wadsworth's bid gave Wadsworth the ability to "repent" after the 
bid opening. Like the bidder in Bolander, Wadsworth placed itself 
in a position where it could "repent its bid" if, after the bid 
opening, it " discovered it had bid too low in comparison to the 
other bidders and would lose money on the job." 451 N.W.2d, at 
207. This test is particularly relevant in the present case in 
view of the evidence that, prior to submitting Wadsworth's bid, 
Ralph Wadsworth was worried that the bid prepared by his son was 
too low (more than $200,000.00 below the Engineer's Estimate of 
$928,615.70), and in view of Guy Wadsworth's statement that "...we 
wanted to hedge our bets, I guess." 
In addition, the irregularity in Wadsworth's bid gave 
Wadsworth an unfair advantage by allowing Wadsworth to "further 
negotiate11 after the bid opening by choosing the most favorable of 
the two price figures as its intended bid, after comparing its bid 
to those of other bidders. The two total ptice figures submitted 
by wadsworth straddled the total price figure submitted by Gerber, 
one high and one low. If there had been no other bidder within the 
21 
high to low range of Wadsworth's two figures, then Wadsworth could 
have argued for the higher pencil price by requesting that the 
pencil informality be waived, as the County has on occasion waived 
the ink requirement and the requirement that all prices be in 
writing as well as in numbers. It is important to note that 
Wadsworth failed to write its prices both in words and numerals, 
as required by section 1.2.04 of the Instructions to Bidders. 
In summary, viewing the above facts and reasonable inferences 
from those facts in the light most favorable to the County, the 
board of county commissioners had a "reasonable basis" for 
rejecting Wadsworth1s bid proposal as non-responsive to the 
County's invitation for bids. The irregularity contained in the 
bid proposal submitted by Wadsworth violated the Rules Governing 
Bids and made Wadsworth's bid materially non-responsive because: 
(1) it was ambiguous as to the total bid price, and (2) it gave 
Wadsworth an unfair competitive advantage by allowing Wadsworth to 
claim either of the two bid prices as its intended bid after the 
bids were opened. The board's determination was not arbitrary or 
capricious or an abuse of discretion, and in the absence of such 
a finding, the district court erred, as a matter of law, by 
improperly substituting the court's own judgment for that of the 
board as to whether or not Wadsworth's bid was responsive to the 
County's invitation for bids. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, WADSWORTH'S BID PROPOSAL WAS WRONGFULLY 
REJECTED, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN WADSWORTH'S FAVOR UNDER THE THEORIES OF BREACH OF 
CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE. 
Wadsworth alleged in its motion for summary judgment that it 
was entitled to recover damages in the nature of lost profits under 
two separate theories of liability, namely: (1) "breach of 
contract to award the project to Wadsworth" and (2) "negligence in 
considering and rejecting Wadsworth's bid" (R. 225). 
The district court granted Wadsworth's motion for summary 
judgment "as prayed" and ruled that: "Defendants [County] breached 
contractual duties and duties of due care owing to plaintiff in 
rejecting plaintiff's bid as nonresponsive." (R. 430). It is the 
County's position that Wadsworth was not entitled to summary 
judgment under either theory of liability. 
A. 
THERE WAS NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP, EITHER EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED, BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND WADSWORTH; THEREFORE, 
THERE COULD BE NO BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL DUTIES BY THE 
COUNTY. 
Courts in all jurisdictions, including Utah, have universally 
held that an advertisement for bids is not itself an offer, rather 
the bid is the offer which creates no rights until accepted. 
Particularly in the case of public contracts, there is no contract 
even after acceptance of the bid until there has been compliance 
with certain formalities required by law, such as a written 
contract. 1 Williston on Contracts, (3rd Ed.) section 31. 
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In Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974), the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of whether a bid 
proposal submitted in response to an invitation to bid for a public 
construction contract creates any contractual relationship, either 
express or implied, between the bidder and the public authority. 
The Court concluded that it did not. 
In the Rapp case, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for 
expenses he incurred in preparing and submitting a bid to construct 
a building at the Salt Lake City International Airport. The 
plaintiff protested the City's award of the contract to the 
successful bidder on the grounds that the action of the City was 
not taken in good faith and that the City had failed to disclose 
to the bidders that a competitive advantage had been granted to the 
successful bidder. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which the trial court granted. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to 
recover damages on several theories, all of which were rejected by 
the Utah Supreme Court. The first theory plaintiff argued was 
breach of contract, contending that he had "a collateral implied 
in fact contract" which was breached by the City: 
Plaintiff urges that in a bidding situation two distinct 
contracts are involved. Under the first contract, since 
the governmental entity might reject all bids, the 
solicitation of bids is not a promise to accept the 
lowest or best bid; plaintiff concedes that the bid is 
a mere offer which must be accepted and all statutory 
formalities fulfilled prior to the existence of a binding 
contract. He insists that there is a second, collateral 
contract under which the government bv soliciting bids 
impliedly promises to give fair consideration to all of 
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the competitive bids and this promise is supported by the 
time, effort, and expense in so preparing the bid* 
(Emphasis added.) 
527 P.2d, at 654. The Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's 
argument that there was any implied contract between the bidder and 
the government. After first explaining the distinction between 
express and implied in fact contracts, the Court stated that there 
could be no contractual liability, express or implied, binding upon 
the City until the requirements of a writing and sanction of the 
board of commissioners had been complied with: 
[1] An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not 
itself an offer, rather the bid or the tender is an offer 
which creates no right until accepted. Particularly in 
the case of public contracts, the requirements of certain 
formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates 
that even after acceptance of the bid, there is no 
contract until there has been compliance with the 
requisite formalities. (Emphasis added.) 
527 P.2d, at 654. The Court then held that the City's invitation 
to bid and the plaintiff's response thereto could not be 
interpreted as "a manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain" 
out of which a binding contract could arise: 
[2] The invitation to bid by the City may not be 
interpreted as an offer for a binding contract; this 
action and plaintiff's response may not be reasonably 
construed as a manifestation of mutual assent indicating 
an intention of the parties to be bound by a contract, 
the terms of which were certain. Additionally, 
plaintiff's theory must fail since no contractual 
liability can be created without compliance with the 
previously cited ordinances. 
527 P.2d, at 654. 
Applying the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the Rapp decision to the facts of the present case, and viewing the 
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facts in the light most favorable to the County, there was no 
contract between the County and Wadsworth. The invitation of the 
County to bid and Wadsworth's response cannot be reasonably 
interpreted as a "manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain, 
the terms of which were certain." First, because the County's 
Invitation to Bid was expressly conditioned upon the acceptance of 
the proposal and the awarding of the contract by the board of 
county commissioners, there could be no "manifestation of mutual 
assent to make a bargain" prior to the occurrence of that 
condition. Second, the County's ordinances, like the City's 
ordinances relied upon by the Court in the Rapp case, provide that 
no contract shall be binding on the County unless it is reduced to 
writing and approved by the board of county commissioners: 
Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize 
the making of all contracts to which the county may be 
a party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf 
of or be binding on the county unless it is entered into 
by ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and 
approved by the commission, or expressly authorized by 
ordinance or resolution. No such ordinance or resolution 
shall be passed until it has remained on file at least 
one week. (Emphasis added.) 
The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as amended, 
section 1-2-9. Under the holding of the Supreme Court in Rapp, 
there could be no contract between the County cind Wadsworth until 
there had been compliance with the previously cited requisite 
formalities of an ordinance or resolution or a contract reduced to 
writing and approved by the commission. In the absence of the 
required formalities, there was no contract between the County and 
Wadsworth. As a result, there could be no breach of contractual 
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duties by the County. 
Thus, the district court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling 
that the County breached contractual duties owed to Wadsworth and 
in granting summary judgment in Wadsworth!s favor under a breach 
of contract theory. 
B. 
THE COURTS HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
"NEGLIGENT CONSIDERATION AND REJECTION OF BIDS" IN THE 
AREA OF PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS. 
Wadsworth alleged in its motion for summary judgment that it 
was entitled to recover damages in the nature of lost profits for 
the County's "negligence in considering and rejecting Wadsworthfs 
bid." (R. 225). 
In support of this contention, Wadsworth cited four cases in 
its memorandum (R. 243-244). A review of these cases reveals that 
none of them involve "negligent consideration and rejection of 
bids" on public construction contracts. Moreover, the County is 
not aware of any cases from any jurisdiction which have applied a 
simple negligence standard as the appropriate standard of judicial 
review for contested awards of public construction contracts. See 
Annotation, 65 ALR4th 93, section 14. 
The appropriate standard of judicial review for contested 
awards of public construction contracts, as discussed above under 
Point I, is that the courts will not attempt to control the 
discretion of public officials nor substitute the courts1 judgment 
for that of the public officials, except upon a finding of abuse 
of discretion, fraud, or corruption. It has been observed: 
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.. .courts generally will not interfere in the competitive 
bidding process even if the agency's decision appears 
erroneous or if reasonable persons may disagree. To 
overturn any allegedly incorrect award, the court would 
have to find that it was arbitrary and capricious, a 
relatively rare occurrence. (Emphasis added.) 
Stein, Construction Law, Vol. 1 (Matthew Bender 1990) section 
2.03[3][b][i]; Liberty County v. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete. 421 
So.2d 505 (Fla. 1982). 
In the present case, the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment in Wadsworth's favor under a theory of negligence 
for the following reasons. First, Wadsworth's complaint fails to 
allege a claim for negligence. Second, even if it did allege a 
claim for negligence, such claim has not been recognized by the 
courts as an actionable claim in light of the appropriate standard 
of judicial review for contested awards of public construction 
contracts, as discussed above. Third, even if such claim were 
actionable, summary judgment was inappropriate in the present case 
in view of the evidence in the record which, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the County, raises genuine issues as to 
material facts such as: (1) whether the board of county 
commissioners exercised reasonable care in considering and 
rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal, (2) whether Wadsworth was 
contributorily negligent by having submitted admittedly confusing 
multiple sets of bid prices in its bid proposal, and (3) the 
percentage of negligence attributable to the County and to 
Wadsworth in this action. 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT WADSWORTH WAS 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF ANTICIPATED 
LOST PROFITS. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the County 
wrongfully rejected Wadsworthfs bid and is liable for "breach of 
contract to award the project to Wadsworth" or "negligence in 
considering and rejecting Wadsworthfs bid," all of which the County 
disputes as discussed above, the district court erred, as a matter 
of law in ruling that Wadsworth was entitled to recover damages in 
the nature of anticipated lost profits in the amount of $62,344.15. 
A. 
THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO A WRONGFULLY REJECTED BIDDER 
ON A PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT DO NOT INCLUDE AN AWARD 
OF ANTICIPATED LOST PROFITS. 
Although the courts have recognized a number of various 
remedies available to wrongfully rejected bidders in the area of 
public construction contracts, such as injunction, declaratory 
relief, or mandamus, the courts have uniformly rejected claims for 
anticipated lost profits: 
An unsuccessful bidder on a state or local public 
construction contract cannot recover lost profits, as a 
measure of damages in a successful suit, in the absence 
of fraud or other extraordinary circumstances. The 
courts generally reason that lost profits are obtainable 
only as a remedy for breach of contract. Because a 
disappointed bidder on a project never actually entered 
into a contract, under which it would have made such 
anticipated profits, there is no breach of contract and, 
therefore, no recovery. A bidder may, however, be able 
to recover bid preparation costs or damages for civil 
rights violations or for malicious interference with the 
right to secure a contract. (Emphasis added.) 
Stein, Construction Law, section 2.03[3] [c] (Matthew Bender, 1990), 
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citing, e.g., Rubino v. Lolli. 10 Cal.App.3d 1059, 89 Cal.Rptr 320 
(1970); Old Town Development Corp. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 249 
Cal.App.2d 313, 57 Cal.Rptr. 426 (1967); William A. Berbusse, Jr., 
Inc. v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 117 So.2d 550 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 
1960); Hassett Storage Warehouse v. Board of Elect.. 69 Ill.App.3d 
972, 387 N.E.2d 785 (1979); Paul Sardella Constr. Co. v. Braintree 
Housing Auth., 371 Mass. 235, 356 N.E.2d 249 (1976); Talbot Pav. 
Co. v. Citv of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896); M.A. 
Stephen Constr. Co. v. Borough of Rumson, 125 N.J.Super. 67, 308 
A.2d 380, cert, denied, 64 N.J. 315, 315 A.2d 404 (1973); Latin 
Belly Ltd. v. State, 83 App.Div.2d 706, 442 N.Y.S.2d 265, appeal 
dismissed, 55 N.Y.2d 603, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 131 N.E.2d 643 (1981); 
Carroll-Ratner Corp. v. City Manager. 54 Misc.2d 625, 283 N.Y.S.2d 
218 (Sup.Ct. 1967); R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School Dist., 400 Pa. 391, 
162 A.2d 623 (1960). See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd 
Ed.), section 29.86. See also Annotation: Public Contracts: Low 
Bidder's Monetary Relief Against State or Local Agency for Nonaward 
of Contract, 65 ALR4th 93. 
As recognized by the courts in the above-cited cases, there 
are sound public policy reasons for the rule that a disappointed 
bidder does not have a right of action for damages against a public 
body based upon a statutory requirement that contracts for the 
construction of public works shall be let to the lowest bidder. 
First, such statutes and ordinances are enacted as a 
protection to the public treasury, and the power for letting public 
contracts pursuant thereto is exercised for the public benefit and 
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is not intended as a direct benefit to any particular bidder. 
Second, the failure of public officials to award a contract 
to the lowest bidder should not be grounds for penalizing the 
public twice; by first requiring the additional expenditure of 
public funds on the awarded contract and then allowing recovery for 
lost profits to the aggrieved low bidder. 
Third, awarding lost profits would encourage bidders to delay 
the filing of their bid protests until after construction has begun 
or been completed, thereby subjecting public entities to endless 
lawsuits by disappointed bidders and resulting in greater costs to 
the public than if a timely protest had been filed prior to the 
start of construction when injunctive or declaratory relief would 
have been available. 
Although courts refuse to award damages in the nature of lost 
profits, a few courts have begun to allow a wrongfully rejected 
bidder to recover bid preparation costs under certain 
circumstances. The courts have used two legal theories to allow 
recovery: (1) that it is an implied condition of every invitation 
for bids issued by a public authority that each bid will be fairly 
considered in accordance with competitive bidding statutes, similar 
to the federal model in the U.S. Claims Court; and (2) promissory 
estoppel. Stein, Construction Law, section 2.03[3][c]. 
For example, in Paul Sardella Construction Co. v. Braintree 
Housing Authority, 356 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 1976), the court held that 
where the public authority had failed to give fair consideration 
to all of the submitted bids as required by the applicable statute, 
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the proper measure of recovery to the wrongfully rejected bidder 
was "the reasonable cost of preparing the bid." 356 N.E.2d, at 
766-67. See also Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County, 648 F.2d 
1084 (6th Cir. 1981). Similarly, two other jurisdictions, 
California and Florida, have allowed the recovery of bid 
preparation costs to wrongfully rejected bidders where injunctive 
or declaratory relief was ineffective because the contract was 
partially or fully performed during the pendency of the protest. 
The California and Florida courts relied upon the theory of 
promissory estoppel in allowing recovery of bid preparation costs. 
Swinerton & Walbera v. City of Incrlewood, 40 Cal.App.3d 98, 114 
Cal.Rptr. 834 (1974) ; Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete v. Liberty 
County, 406 So.2d 461 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1981), rev'd, 421 So.2d 505 
(Fla. 1982). 
However, in the Rapp case cited above, the Utah Supreme Court 
declined to follow the minority view which allows the recovery of 
bid preparation costs under an implied contract theory. In Rapp, 
the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected the plaintiff's 
contention that there was an implied contract "...under which the 
government by soliciting bids impliedly promises to give fair 
consideration to all of the competitive bids and this promise is 
supported by the time, effort, and expense in so preparing the 
bid." 527 P.2d 651, at 654. Instead, the Court in Rapp denied the 
recovery of bid preparation costs sought under a theory of implied 
contract. The Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority viewpoint 
which takes the position that an unsuccessful bidder may not 
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recover money damages in the nature of either lost profits or bid 
preparation costs. 
B. 
EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, WADSWORTH WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS, WADSWORTH FAILED 
TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, THEREBY 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In ruling that Wadsworth was entitled to recover lost profits 
in the amount of $62,344.15, the district court relied on the two 
sworn affidavits of Ralph L. Wadsworth (R. 226-228, 378-380). The 
County filed a motion to strike these affidavits (R. 419-420). 
In Howarth v. Ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442 (Utah 1973), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the plaintifffs claimed loss of anticipated 
profits from a business venture was too speculative to be 
considered. The Court noted the rule that no recovery can be had 
for loss of profits which are determined to be uncertain, 
contingent, conjectural, or speculative: 
The problem as to when and under what circumstances 
damages may be recovered for loss in operating a business 
is, as is true in so many controversial areas in the law, 
a coin that has at least two sides to it. The basic and 
general rule is that loss of anticipated profits of a 
business venture involve so many factors of uncertainty 
that ordinarily profits to be realized in the future are 
too speculative to base an award of damages thereon. The 
other side of the coin is that damages to a business or 
enterprise need only be proved with sufficient certainty 
that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the damages were actually suffered. 
(Emphasis added.) 
515 P.2d, at 445. 
Applying the law to the facts of the present case, material 
issues of fact exist with regard to the amount, if any, of 
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Wadsworth1s alleged damages in the nature of lost profits, thereby 
precluding summary judgment. 
First, Ralph Wadsworth's own contradictory sworn statements 
show uncertainty as to lost profits. His affidavits contradict and 
are contradicted by his sworn answers to defendants' first set of 
interrogatories, which allege lost profits in the amount of 
$69,263.45 (R. 352-357). 
Second, both sworn affidavits are completely without 
foundation in that they are not supported by any business records, 
business profit history, expert testimony, or other reliable 
evidence. They merely reflect amounts which Wadsworth hoped to 
make on the project. Because the affidavits are without proper 
foundation, they do not set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, as required by Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, Ralph Wadsworth, who swore to and signed 
both affidavits, testified at his deposition that he did not have 
anything to do with the preparation of the bid, that he was not 
involved at all as far as providing the figures that went into the 
bid document, except for adding the pencil figures just prior to 
the bid opening, and that he did not actually review the bid 
document (R. 438, pp. 5-9). 
Third, in response to defendants1 first set of 
interrogatories, Wadsworth was unable to identify or produce any 
documentation relating to the factual basis or evidence upon which 
the claimed calculation Of damages was based (R. 352-353) . In the 
absence of any documentation for critical items such as the bid 
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price amounts from subcontractors or the prices available to 
Wadsworth for equipment, labor, and materials, there exists only 
uncertainty and speculation as to the factual basis for Wadsworth1s 
calculation of damages. In addition, Wadsworth1s answers to 
interrogatories concerning the calculation of damages establish 
that Wadsworth took no steps to reduce or mitigate its damages, 
which failure should reduce or eliminate Wadsworth1s claim under 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 
Fourth, Wadsworth's claim that he intended to make, and would 
have made, a 10% profit on the project ignores the realities and 
uncertainties inherent in the area of public works construction 
projects. Especially in view of the fact that Wadsworth1s claimed 
intended bid was more than $200,000.00 below the Engineer's 
Estimate of $928,615.70, it is highly uncertain and speculative 
that Wadsworth would have made its hoped-for profit. It is more 
probable that Wadsworth would have lost money on the job, being so 
far below the Engineerfs Estimate of the project costs. In 
addition, Wadsworth failed to show any prior business history where 
it had made a 10% profit on any single project or on any regular 
basis which would remove its claim from the realms of conjecture 
and speculation. 
Accordingly, Wadsworth's claimed amount of lost profits was 
uncertain, and genuine issues of material fact existed with regard 
to the amount, if any, of Wadsworth's claimed damages, thus 
precluding summary judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendants respectfully request 
that the Court vacate the summary judgment entered by the district 
court below and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
i/HSTHORPE ~ EY  
Deputy/County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jeffrey H. Thorpe, certify that on the 15th day of October, 
1990, I served four copies of the attached Brief of Appellants upon 
Beesley & Fairclough, counsel for the appellee in this matter, by 
personally serving it at the following address: 
300 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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ADDENDA 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY #0257 
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
3 00 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., i 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political • 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH, : 
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION, s 
Defendants. : 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. C-85-5681 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The Motion of plaintiff Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, Inc. for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the 
above entitled Court on November 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m., the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. Plaintiff was represented by 
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. and defendants 
were represented by Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Esq. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda submitted and arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES: 
1 CO 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Ralph L* 
Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. is hereby granted as prayed. 
2. Defendants were required to award the subject construction 
project to the low, responsive, responsible bidder. 
3. Plaintiff was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on 
the subject project and defendants should have awarded the project 
to plaintiff. 
4. Defendants breached contractual duties and duties of due 
care owing to plaintiff in rejecting plaintiff's bid as 
nonresponsive. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants and each 
of them in the amount of $62,344.15 together with plaintiff's costs 
incurred in this matter and prejudgment interest at the statutory 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from March 27, 1987 until the 
date of judgment. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest at the 
statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of 
this Judgment until paid in full. 
Dated this /**T day of December, 1989. 
BY T 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
-^^^•//•'idi^ Esq. 
imes S. Sawaya 
District Court Judge 
oo 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this /^"^day of 
December, 1989: 
Jeffery H. Thorpe 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
K^r4^ 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 937. ^ ^
 o r f l l i n g 0f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
" c S S . - 41921C3J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f
 Ff "*? * * " ?** °/ a P ? l i c a t i o n ** d f 
AX.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- fault J u t o n t where notice is required only 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d b v custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 




—Contents. —Facts considered. 
—Corporation. —Improper evidence. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. —Proof. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. —Weight of testimony. 
Resting on pleadings. Improper party plaintiff. 
—Sufficiency. Issue of fact. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. —Corporate existence. 
—Superseding pleadings. —Deeds. 
—Unpleaded defenses. —Lease as security. 
—Verified pleading. Judicial attitude. 
—Waiver of right to contest. Motion for new trial. 
—When unavailable. Motion to dismiss. 
—Who may make. Motion to reconsider. 
Affirmative defense. Notice. 
Answers to interrogatories. —Provision not jurisdictional. 
Appeal. —Waiver of defect. 
—Standard of review. Procedural due process. 
Attorney's fees. Summary judgment. 
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1.2.1—1-2-4 ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCES 
Chapter 2 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Sections: 
1-2-1. County Commission — Number — Eligibility 
1-2-2. Term of Office 
1-2-3. Vacancies — How Filled 
1-2-4. Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision 
1-2-5. Departments 
1-2-6. Meetings 
1-2-7. Special Meetings 
1-2-8. Chairman — Quorum —- May Administer Oaths 
1-2-9. Contracts 
Sec. 1-2-1. County Commission — Number — Eligibility. The Salt 
Lake County Commission shall consist of three members, each of whom 
shall have been an elector of the county for at least one year immediately 
preceding the election and elected by the qualified electors of the coimty 
at large. 
Sec 1-2-2. Term of Office. County commissioners shall be elected at 
the general election next preceding the expiration of the term of office 
of incumbents; one for a term of four years and one for a term of two 
years, and each shall hold office for the term for which elected and until 
a successor is elected and has qualified 
Sec 1-2-3. Vacancies — How Filled. Whenever a vacancy occurs in 
the board of county commissioners through ineligibility, resignation or 
death of the incumbent or of the officer elect before qualifying, or through 
refusal to act, or for any other reason, the board must fill the vacancy 
by appointment. Should the board fail to make the appointment within 
thirty days after the vacancy occurs, the clerk shall notify the governor 
of the fact, and the governor shall within thirty days after receipt of notice 
fill the vacancy by appointment. If at any time there shall not be a ma-
jority of the board remaining in office, the governor shall appoint one 
or two commissioners as the case may be until there shall be a majority, 
and the majority shall select the third as herein provided. Appointees 
shall hold office for the unexpired term. Any appointment under the pro-
visions of this section must be made from a list of at least six persons 
who have been endorsed in writing by the central county committee of 
the party to which the person belonged who occasioned the vacancy. 
Sec 1-2-4. Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision. The county com-
mission shall be the legislative division of county government and may 
supervise the official conduct of all county and department officers and 
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officers of all precincts, districts and other subdivisions of the county (except 
municipal corporations), and shall see that they faithfully perform their 
duties, direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and, when necessary, require 
them to renew their official bond, make reports and present their books and 
accounts for inspection. The commission shall have such other powers and 
duties as are prescribed by law. 
Sec. 1-2-5. Departments. Each commissioner shall have the supervision of 
such departments and boards of county government as lend themselves to 
joint classification and each department or board shall bear such title and 
designation as the board of county commissioners shall from time to time 
devise, provided, that said title shall, as nearly as possible, represent the true 
nature of those functions performed by the officers and employees of sr * 
department or board. 
Sec. 1-2-6. Meetings. The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, shall hold three regular public meetings in each and 
every week during the year in the Commission Chambers in the City and 
County Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, which meetings shall be held on 
Monday and Wednesday at the hour often o'clock A.M., and Thursday at ni)» 
o'clock A.M., except that in case any of such days falls upon a holiday, said 
meeting shall be deemed adjourned until the next succeeding meeting date as 
aforesaid, provided, however, that the time of said meetings may be changed 
or altered to any other time on the same day by the vote of at least two (2) 
members of the said Board, duly entered into the minutes of any preceding 
meeting thereof; and provided further, that any meeting of the said Board 
may be recessed, once convened, to any other time, place or day prior to the 
next succeeding regular meeting. Any regularly scheduled meeting may I 
cancelled in advance by a vote of any two members of said Board taken at a 
duly convened regular meeting, in the event there will be no business to 
transact or when it is known in advance a quorum cannot be obtained. 
(Amended 5/29/75.) 
Sec. 1-2-7. Special Meetings. Special meetings may be called by any two 
commissioners or by the chairman upon a five-day notice to any absent 
commissioner and upon entry into the minutes of the board of an order signed 
by the members or chairman calling such meeting, provided, that the 
requirement of a notice shall not be binding in any special meeting at which all 
of the members of the commission are present and effectively waive such 
requirement. 
It shall be the duty of the county clerk when given copies of such notices 
to serve or cause the same to be served immediately. 
The order must specify the business to be transacted at such special 
meeting and none other than that specified shall be transacted thereat unless 
all members of the commission are present and consent thereto. 
Sec. 1-2-8. Chairman — Quorum — May Administer Oaths. County com-
missioners shall elect one of their members chairman to preside at all meet-
ings of the board. In case of the chairman's absence or inability to act, the 
(Printed 6/30/80) 
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members present must, by an order entered in their minutes, select one of 
their members to act as chairman temporarily. Any member of the board may 
administer oaths to any person when necessary in the performance of his 
official duties. Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum for the 
transaction of business, and no act of the board shall be valid or binding unless 
two members concur therein. 
Sec. 1-2-9. Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize the making 
of all contracts to which the county may be a party, and no contract shall be 
entered into on behalf of or be binding on the county unless it is entered into 
by ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and approved by the 
commission, or expressly authorized by ordinance or resolution. No such 
ordinance or resolution shall be passed until it has remained on file at least 
one week. 
Chapter 3 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Sections: 
1-3-1. Purpose 
1-3-2. Administrative Classifications - Employment of 
Administrative Personnel 
1-3-3. Administrative Services 
1-3-4. Human Services 
1-3-5. Public Works 
1-3-6. Limitation 
1-3-7. Executive Council 
1-3-8. Steering Council 
1-3-9. Policies and Procedures 
Sec. 1-3-1. Purpose. It is the intent of the board of county commissioners 
to organize the executive department of county government in a manner 
designed to provide service delivery to the public in an efficient and 
coordinated manner. Certain of the divisions, boards and commissions 
described in this chapter have statutory duties and contractual prerogatives 
independent of authority delegated by the board of county commissioners and 
it is not the intent of the board to preempt, abrogate or diminish such 
authority. Neither are the functional descriptions meant to be exhaustive of 
the duties assigned and delegated to the respective organizational 
subdivisions. However, it is deemed necessary by the board of county 
commissioners to include all subdivisions of government within a single 
management structure for purposes of effective administration and 
coordination. Further, all county executive authority not expressly granted 
by law or interlocal agreement to other officers, boards or commissions is 
reserved to the board of county commissioners acting jointly, severally or 
through its administrative designees and the exercise of such authority is 
subject to the board's final approval and direction. 
(Printed 6/30/80) 
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18-1-1. Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids 
18-1-2. Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids 
18-1-3. Emergency Contracts 
18-1-4. Requisition Agents 
18-1-5. Advertisements for Bids — Deposits 
18-1-6. Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition 
18-1-7. Opening of Bids 
18-1-8. Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or Conto 
— Public Inspection 
18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination 
18-1-10. Rejection of Bids 
18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders 
18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts 
Sec. 18-1-1. Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids. Excel* 
as otherwise herein provided, all county purchase orders and contracts of 
every kind, involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00, for labor and services, 
or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, materials, equipment 
or supplies, shall be let by competitive bidding after advertisement, to the 
lowest responsible bidder, or in the appropriate instance, to the higher 
responsible bidder, depending upon whether the county is to expend or to 
receive the money. 
All purchase orders or contracts less than $5,000.00, and in excess of 
$300.00, shall be let in the open market in a manner calculated to insure the 
best interests of the public and after solicitation of bids by mail, telephone or 
otherwise. All bids in excess of $1,000.00 shall be in writing. Unless otherwise 
authorized by the board of county commissioners, the purchasing agent shall 
obtain at least three competitive bids. 
The commission may waive the above requirements at such time as the 
public good justifies such action and shall not be prohibited by the terms of 
this section from awarding contracts or purchase orders without 
advertisement or other solicitation if the item to be procured is a brand-name 
type product which can be procured from only one source. Any department, 
office, board or other agency of the county desiring to requisition a 
brand-name type product which would require a waiver of the bidding 
requirements in this section must submit a letter of justification to the 
purchasing agent which must specify why the brand-name type product is 
required and set forth the reasons why normal bidding requirements should 
be waived. No contract or purchase order in excess of $500.00 may be awarded 
(Printed 6/30/80) 
403 
18-1-2-18-1-3 PURCHASING PROCEDURES 
for such brand-name type product without the approval of the commission. 
The purchasing agent must, in the performance of his duties, comply with 
the requirements specified in 17-15-3 U.C.A. 1953. 
Sec. 18-1-2. Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids. Contracts which 
by their nature are not adapted to award by competitive bidding, such as 
contracts for the services of individuals possessing a high degree of pro-
fessional skill, where the ability or fitness of the individual plays an important 
part, contracts for the printing of finance committee pamphlets, auditor's 
estimates and departmental reports, contracts for the printing or engraving 
of bonds, water certificates, tax warrants and other evidences of 
indebtedness, contracts for utility services such as water, light, heat, 
telephone and telegraph, and contracts for the purchase of magazines, books, 
periodicals, and similar articles of an educational or instructional nature, shall 
not be subject to the competitive bidding requirements of this ordinance. The 
purchasing agent is expressly authorized to procure from any federal, state or 
local unit, or agency thereof, such materials, supplies, commodities or their 
equivalent, as may be made available through the operation of any legislation, 
without conforming to the competitive bidding requirements of this chapter. 
Regular employment contracts in the service of the county, whether with 
respect to classified service which may be later enacted, or otherwise, shall 
not be subject to the provisions of this chapter, nor shall this chapter be 
applicable to the granting or issuance, pursuant to powers conferred by laws, 
ordinances or resolutions, of franchises, licenses, permits or other 
authorizations by the corporate authorities of the municipality, or by 
departments, offices, institutions, boards, commissions, agencies or other 
instrumentalities of the county. 
Sec. 18-1-3. Emergency Contracts. In case of an emergency affecting the 
public health or safety, the Salt Lake County Commission may, at a duly 
convened meeting, unanimously require, without public advertisement, that 
contracts be let to the extent necessary to resolve such emergency. The 
resolution or ordinance permitting such action shall fix the date upon which 
such emergency shall terminate, provided that such date may be extended or 
abridged by the commission as circumstances require. 
The purchasing agent, or any agency of the county authorized in writing 
by the purchasing agent, may, subject to the approval of the board of county 
commissioners, purchase in the open market without filing a requisition for 
estimate, and without advertisement, supplies, materials or equipment in an 
amount not exceeding $10,000.00. A full written account of any such 
emergency, together with a requisition for the materials, supplies or 
equipment which it required, shall be submitted immediately to the 
purchasing agent and shall be open to public inspection for a period of at least 
one year subsequent to the date of the emergency purchase. 
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Sec. 18-1-4. Requisition Agents. Each major department, office, board or 
other agency of the county shall certify in writing to the purchasing agent the 
names of such officers or employees as shall be authorized to sign requests for 
purchases for such agency, and all such requests for purchases shall be void 
unless executed by such certified officers or employees and approved by the 
purchasing agent. 
Except as to emergency contracts, no undertaking involving amounts in 
excess of $5,000.00 shall be split into parts by any concerned party so as to 
produce amounts of $5,000.00 or less, for the purpose of avoiding the 
provisions of this ordinance. 
Sec. 18-1-5. Advertisements for Bids — Deposits. All proposals to award 
purchase orders or contracts involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00 shall be 
published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published in Salt 
Lake County. The board of county commissioners may reject any an all bids 
for any valid reason. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to 
prohibit the purchasing agent from placing additional announcements in 
recognized trade journals. Advertisements for bids shall describe the 
character of the proposed contract or agreement in sufficient detail to enable 
prospective bidders to know what their obligations will be. The description 
may be made either in the advertisement itself, or by reference to detailed 
plans and specifications on file at the time of the publication of the first 
announcement. The advertisement shall state the date, time and place 
assigned for the opening of bids, and no bids shall be received at any time 
subsequent to the time indicated in the announcement. An extension of time 
may, however, be granted for the opening of such bids upon publication in ? 
newspaper of general circulation throughout Salt Lake County of the date to 
which the bid opening has been extended. The time for the opening of the 
extended bid shall be not less than 10 days after the publication thereof, 
Sundays and legal Holidays excluded. 
Cash, a cashier's check, a certified check or a comptroller's certificate of 
monies owed the particular vendor, as a deposit of good faith, in a reasonable 
amount, but not in excess of 10% of the contract amount, may be required of 
each bidder by the purchasing agent on all bids involving amounts in excess of 
$5,000.00. 
Sec. 18-1-6. Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition. 
Any agreement or collusion among bidders or prospective bidders, to bid a 
fixed price shall render the bids of such bidders void. Each bidder shall 
accompany his bid with a sworn statement that he has not been a party to any 
such agreement. Any disclosure made or permitted by the purchasing agent 
in advance of the opening of bids, of the terms of the bids submitted in 
response to an advertisement, shall render the entire proceeding void and 
shall require re-advertisement and re-award. 
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Sec. 18-l-7o Opening of Bids. All sealed bids shall be publicly opened by 
the purchasing agent or by an officer or employee in the office of the 
purchasing agent who is duly authorized in writing by the purchasing agent to 
open such bids. 
Sec. 18-1-8. Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or 
Contract — Public Inspection. The award of any contract involving amounts 
in excess of $5,000.00 shall be made by the board of county commissioners to 
the lowest or highest responsible bidders meeting specifications as provided 
in section 18-1-5 above. Each bid, with the name of the bidder, shall be 
entered on a record, which record, with the name of the successful bidder 
indicated thereon, shall after award of the contract or purchase order, be 
open to public inspection in the office of the purchasing agentc 
All purchase orders or contracts involving amounts of $5,000.00 or less 
shall be awarded by the purchasing agent to the lowest or highest responsible 
bidders as provided in section 18-1-1 above and shall be signed by the 
purchasing agent and submitted to the commission for approval and 
ratification. 
An official copy of each awarded purchase order or contract, together 
with all necessary attachments, including assignments and written consents 
of the purchasing agent, shall be retained by the purchasing agent in an 
appropriate file open to the public for such period of time after termination of 
the contract as an action against the county might ensue under applicable 
statutes of limitations. After such period, purchase orders, contracts and 
attachments may be destroyed by direction of purchasing agent. 
Sec, 18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination. In determining 
the responsibility of any bidder, the commission may take into account other 
factors in addition to financial responsibility, such as past records or 
transactions with the bidder, experience, adequacy of equipment, ability to 
complete performance within a specified time limit and other pertinent con-
siderations. 
Sec. 18-1-10. Rejection of Bids. Any and all bids received in response to 
an advertisement may be rejected by the board of county commissioners if the 
bidder is not deemed responsible, or the character or quality of the services, 
supplies, materials, equipment or labor does not conform to requirements, or 
if the public interest may otherwise be served thereby. 
Sec. 18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders. Bonds with sufficient sureties and in such 
amounts as shall be deemed adequate and approved by the board of county 
commissioners, not only to insure performance of the contract or purchase 
order in the time and manner prescribed, but also to save, indemnify, and 
hold the county harmless against losses, damages, claims, liabilities, 
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judgments, costs, and expenses which may accrue in consequence of the 
granting or the contract or purchase order, shall be required of each bidder on 
such contracts and purchase orders as involve amounts in excess of $5,000.00. 
$5,000.00. 
Sec. 18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts. No contract awarded to the 
lowest responsible bidder or to the highest responsible bidder, as the case 
may be, shall be assignable by the successful bidder without the written 
consent of the board of county commissioners. In no event shall a contract or 
any part thereof be assigned to a bidder who is declared not to be a 
responsible bidder in the consideration of bids submitted in response to 




18-2-1. Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond 
18-2-2. Purchasing Agent — Powers and Duties 
18-2-3. Revolving Fund 
18-2-4. Purchasing Agent — Execution of Contracts 
18-2-5. Contracts Executed in Violation of This Ordinance 
18-2-6. Local Improvement Projects 
18-2-7. Penalty 
Sec. 18-2-1. Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond. The purchasing agent 
shall perform or direct the performance of all such duties as are required by 
the provisions of this chapter. The salary for the purchasing agent shall bo 
fixed by the board of county commissioners which shall, in addition, require 
the purchasing agent to post bond with adequate surety in an amount to be 
determined by the commission and conditioned upon his faithful performance 
of such duties as are here required. 
Sec. 18-2-2. Purchasing Agent — Powers And Duties. The purchasing 
agent shall: 
(1) Recommend adoption, promulgation, and from time to time 
revision, of the rules and regulations of the proper conduct of this office; 
(2) Constitute the sole agent of the county in contracting for labor, 
materials, or services, or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, 
materials, equipment or supplies, in conformity with the provisions of this 
Title provided, however, that all contracts and purchase orders must be 
submitted to the commission for approval and ratification as required by 
section 17-5-74, UCA — 1953; 
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